St Malo Agreement

That is why, in addition to all the cost-effective rhetoric, the Franco-British Treaty must be seen in the context of a Europe seeking a new place, both in transatlantic relations and in the world. It turns out that with NATO`s Strategic Approach and one year after the EU`s Lisbon Treaty, if trust and confidence are sufficient over time, it would be implicit in the Treaty that the final creation of a new European pillar could better serve both NATO and the EU. While the economic and industrial aspects of the agreement`s defense indicate a new balance between strategy and affordability (the synergistic essence of partnership), the treaty ultimately reflects the cold and harsh strategic logic of two former powers that include the most critical commodity – influence. At the Franco-British summit on 27 November 2010, Prime Minister David Cameron and President Nicolas Sarkozy agreed to promote cooperation between the British and French armed forces and to improve the sharing of facilities and equipment in order to strengthen the respective defence industrial bases of the two countries. An agreement was also reached on cooperation in the management of nuclear stockpiles. Are the Franco-British Treaty on Defence and Security Cooperation and the associated Downing Street Declaration a new dawn in Franco-British relations? Is this just another step in a competitive game to lead Europe? Or it`s a new St. Malo (under the 1998 bilateral agreement, open to other EU member states), which will give impetus to the common security and defence policy and get Europe out of the Great European Defence Depression? In order to enable the European Union to approve decisions to take both military and military decisions, if the alliance as a whole is not engaged, the Union must have adequate structures and capabilities to analyse situations, sources of information and strategic planning capacity in this area, without unnecessary duplication, taking into account the existing resources of the EA and the development of its relations with the EU. In this respect, the European Union must also make use of appropriate military means (European capabilities that are pre-with-retiree under the European pillar of NATO or national or multinational European funds outside the NATO framework). The alternative is clear. The last decade has been bloody for both Britain and France. London has lost its influence in Washington and Paris has lost its influence over Berlin. To paraphrase Neville Chamberlain, Britain and France risk becoming small countries, far from the center of power, of which they know little, caught in a narrow-minded struggle to rule the unknown.

To this end, the Union must have the capacity to act autonomously, supported by credible military forces, the means to decide whether to use them and the will to do so to respond to international crises. . . .

That is why, in addition to all the cost-effective rhetoric, the Franco-British Treaty must be seen in the context of a Europe seeking a new place, both in transatlantic relations and in the world. It turns out that with NATO`s Strategic Approach and one year after the EU`s Lisbon Treaty, if trust and confidence are sufficient over time, it would be implicit in the Treaty that the final creation of a new European pillar could better serve both NATO and the EU. While the economic and industrial aspects of the agreement`s defense indicate a new balance between strategy and affordability (the synergistic essence of partnership), the treaty ultimately reflects the cold and harsh strategic logic of two former powers that include the most critical commodity – influence. At the Franco-British summit on 27 November 2010, Prime Minister David Cameron and President Nicolas Sarkozy agreed to promote cooperation between the British and French armed forces and to improve the sharing of facilities and equipment in order to strengthen the respective defence industrial bases of the two countries. An agreement was also reached on cooperation in the management of nuclear stockpiles. Are the Franco-British Treaty on Defence and Security Cooperation and the associated Downing Street Declaration a new dawn in Franco-British relations? Is this just another step in a competitive game to lead Europe? Or it`s a new St. Malo (under the 1998 bilateral agreement, open to other EU member states), which will give impetus to the common security and defence policy and get Europe out of the Great European Defence Depression? In order to enable the European Union to approve decisions to take both military and military decisions, if the alliance as a whole is not engaged, the Union must have adequate structures and capabilities to analyse situations, sources of information and strategic planning capacity in this area, without unnecessary duplication, taking into account the existing resources of the EA and the development of its relations with the EU. In this respect, the European Union must also make use of appropriate military means (European capabilities that are pre-with-retiree under the European pillar of NATO or national or multinational European funds outside the NATO framework). The alternative is clear. The last decade has been bloody for both Britain and France. London has lost its influence in Washington and Paris has lost its influence over Berlin. To paraphrase Neville Chamberlain, Britain and France risk becoming small countries, far from the center of power, of which they know little, caught in a narrow-minded struggle to rule the unknown.

To this end, the Union must have the capacity to act autonomously, supported by credible military forces, the means to decide whether to use them and the will to do so to respond to international crises. . . .

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